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LIKE MACKEREL IN THE MOONLIGHT:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON RICHMOND
NEWSPAPERS
Lillian R. BeVier*
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,1 the Supreme Court

of the United States held that the right of the public and the press to
attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the first and fourteenth

amendments.' Notwithstanding Chief Justice Burger's characterization of the case as presenting a "narrow question," Richmond News-

papers may well signal the arrival of an expansive new first amendment doctrine: According to Justice Stevens, the Court "for the first
time . . . unequivocally [held] that an arbitrary interference with

access to important information is an abridgement of the freedoms

of speech and of the press." 8 Justice Stevens' statement may be

neither a fair reading of the holding' nor an accurate accounting of
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A., 1961, Smith College; J.D., 1965, Stanford University. Thanks to my colleague Paul Stephan, who read an earlier draft and offered
helpful comments, and to Sheila Rathbun, a second-year student who provided useful research
assistance. Also, I acknowledge with gratitude the support of the Virginia Law School
Foundation.
1. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2. Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Stevens, JJ.).
3. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. Justice Stevens' rendition of the holding seems considerably broader than Chief Justice Burger's statement: "We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people
have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be
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the noses of his brethren.5 Still, Richmond Newspapers unquestionably breathed new life into the claim that, as a corollary to its almost
unlimited protection of the freedom to speak and publish regarding
the affairs of government, the Constitution embodies a judicially enforceable "right of access" or "right to gather information" in contexts other than trials.
Though commentators have noted a number of flaws in the series of opinions, 7 many have nevertheless explicitly endorsed the result of the case.8 This comment offers a more skeptical, less forgiving
eviscerated.'" Id. at 580 (citation omitted)(footnotes omitted). One student commentator concluded that "there is no support in [Chief Justice Burger's] opinion for Justice Stevens' extension." Comment, First Amendment-Constitutional Right of Access to Criminal Trials, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547, 550 (1980).
5. Of the seven Justices who voted for the Richmond Newspapers result, four had previously allied themselves with a proposition contrary to that expressed by Justice Stevens. In
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), Justices White and Rehnquist joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion, which stated that "[nleither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information
within the Government's control." Id. at 15 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Rehnquist,
JJ.). In that same case, Justice Stewart announced his view that "[t]he First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by government." Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). The Richmond
Newspapers opinions of these three Justices do not explicitly contradict their prior views. Thus,
it seems as likely that they would vote not to extend the right of access in contexts other than
trials as that they would join Justice Stevens' confident expansion. Of course, since Justice
Stewart will no longer be on the Court to decide future cases, it will be the vote of his successor that will count.
The fifth Justice in the Richmond Newspapers majority, Justice Blackmun, did not participate in Houchins. In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), however, he
joined Justice Stewart's opinion, id. (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ.), rather than ally himself with the dissent of Justice Powell, in which
a constitutional right of access was adumbrated in terms plainly echoed by Justice Stevens in
Richmond Newspapers. See 417 U.S. at 860 (Powell, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun's Richmond Newspapers concurrence does not explain the extent to which the Justice would agree with Justice Powell's first amendment reasoning in contexts other than trials. See 448 U.S. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
6. Cf. 448 U.S. at 576 (whether right to attend criminal trials described as "right of
access" or "right to gather information" said by Chief Justice Burger to be "not crucial").
7. See, e.g., Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 24 (1980)(major flaw in decision is failure of the
several opinions to articulate consensus); Reznek, Gannett v. DePasquale and Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia: Re-opening Courtroom Doors and Constitutional Windows, 10 CAP.
U.L. REv. 101, 125-28 (1980) (opinions leave too many questions unanswered); Comment,
supra note 4, at 555 ("substantial analytical difficulties" in Chief Justice Burger's opinion).
8. ,See, e.g., Cox, supra note 7, at 23 (recognition of right of access "may well be essential if the first amendment is to continue to serve the basic function of keeping the people
informed about their government"); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75,
149 (1980) (decision "should lead to a significant and salutary recasting of much first amendment doctrine"); Note, Public Trials and a First Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption
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assessment of certain aspects of the opinions, particularly those of
Chief Justice Burger 9 and Justice Brennan. 10 This skepticism stems
not from an inclination to devalue the contribution that open trials
and an informed citizenry make to the proper functioning of our
democratic institutions. It is rooted, rather, in the conviction that the
Court is appropriately held accountable for more than the results of
individual cases. When the result in a particular case portends significant new doctrinal developments that will necessarily expand the
Court's power to review the actions of other governmental branches,
both state and federal, it is fair to demand that its proferred rationales sustain a particularly heavy burden of justification.
Despite the near unanimity of the result in Richmond Newspapers, the Court was unable to present even the facade of a unifying
rationale. Eight Justices participated in the decision; 1 only Justice
Rehnquist dissented.' Of the seven Justices who voted for the result,
six wrote separately.' 3 Justice Marshall alone was content to join
without comment in the opinion of one of his brethren. Only he (in
joining Justice Brennan) and Justices White and Stevens (in announcing their adherence to the opinion of Chief Justice Burger)' 5
were willing to join at all in the opinion of a colleague. Finally, Justice Stevens' separate concurrence, 6 because it embraced a rationale
different from that of the Chief Justice, suggests that his agreement
with the Chief Justice is less than total.
Such a cacophony of judicial voices alone implies both the absence of a consensus and the presence of considerable individual intransigence among the members of the Court concerning the access
question. In addition, the opinions of the Justices evidenced a disinclination either to join issue with one another on the matters that
divided them or to explicate their own premises in ways responsive to
of Openness, 60 NEB. L. REv. 169, 198 (1981)(Court "should be applauded" for its decision).

9. 448 U.S. at 558.
10. Id. at 584 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
11. Justice Powell did not participate. Id. at 581.
12. .Id. at 604 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 581 (White, J., concurring); id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 584
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 598 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices

White and Stevens also joined in the opinion of the Court written by Chief Justice Burger. Id.
at 558.

14. Id. at 584 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
15.
16.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 582 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
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points of view their brethren publicly found persuasive. 17 Such disparity, while it may be justified partially by the difficulty of the
question confronting the Court, generates intractable problems of interpretation and prediction for the Court's entire constituency.28 It
thereby warrants an exploration of the various rationales offered in
support of the result.
What has become, and what I refer to in these pages as, the
standard rationale for a first amendment right of access to government information and facilities was first adumbrated by Justice Powell in dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,' 9 and was echoed by
Justice Stevens in his Houchins v. KQED, Inc. dissent.2 0 It proceeds
essentially along the following lines: The core value protected by the
first amendment is the right to participate -in the process of republican self-government. Accordingly, the first amendment protects at
least freedom to discuss government affairs, policies, and personnel;
the freedom to discuss political issues, however, can be rendered
meaningless unless discussion is based on accurate information about
what government is doing, for "public debate must not only be unfettered, it must also be informed. '2 1 Therefore, the first amendment
includes the right of public access to governmental information and,
for the purpose of acquiring information, to governmental' facilities.
Surprisingly, in Richmond Newspapers only Justice Stevens
clearly invoked this standard rationale in support of the decision.22
In part for this reason, and because the rationale's underlying premises and its implications have already been fully explored in the literature, 23 but most importantly because its self-assigned task is less
17. For example, although Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan pursue different
analytical routes to the result, neither opinion contains an explanation of the reasons why the
other's premises are unacceptable. For another example, none of the six opinions in support of
the result even acknowledge, much less attempt a coherent response to, the dissenting opinion
of Justice Rehnquist. Professor Cox chides the Court in this regard for its failure to appreciate
that "nurturing a coherent body of constitutional law is usually more important for members
of the highest court than asserting individual views or staking out claims on the future." Cox,
supra note 7, at 25.
18. Cf., e.g., United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (first amendment
provides right of access to pretrial proceedings as well as to trials, on theory that "principles
that support a right of access to trials apply with equal force to pretrial proceedings," id. at
1344, but disputed by dissenting judges because "[n]o court in the land ...has ever so
ruled," Id. at 1346 (Nebeker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
19. 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974)(Powell, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
20. 438 U.S. 1, 30-38 (1978)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
21. 417 U.S. at 862-63 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
22. See 448 U.S. at 592 (Stevens, J.,
23. See, e.g., BeVier, An Informed Public,An Informing Press:The Searchfor a Con-
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formidable, this article neither addresses the merits of Justice Stevens' position nor attempts to reassess the full range of constitutional
and policy issues posed by claims of access. Instead it focuses on the
opinions of Chief Justice Burger 24 and Justice Brennan.2 5 These two
opinions rest on premises different both from one another and from
the standard right of access rationale.
This article does not focus on the separate concurring opinions
of Justices White, Blackmun, and Stewart, since none of these Justices attempted a sufficiently thorough articulation of their views to
permit an informed assessment.26 Nor does it offer an analysis of the
points raised in Justice Rehnquist's brief dissent,27 except to note
stitutionalPrinciple, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1980); Emerson, Legal Foundationsof the Right
to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "'Rightto

Know," 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1980); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to
Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, The Constitutional Right to
Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977); Note, The First Amendment Right to Gather
State-Held Information, 89 YALE L.J. 923 (1980).
24. 448 U.S. at 558.
25. Id. at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
26. Justice Whites very brief opinion notes merely that, had Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), been decided in accordance with his views with respect to the
sixth amendment, the Court would not have had to decide the first amendment issue. 448 U.S.
at 581-82 (White, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's opinion makes a similar point, though at
greater length and in a somewhat rancorous tone. The opinion refers, for example, to "the
graffiti that marred the prevailing opinions in Gannett," 448 U.S. at 601 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment), and seems to chide Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion for invoking a "veritable potpourri" of the "other possible constitutional sources" for the public
right to attend trials. Id. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun
adopts the first amendment as a source of the right only as a "secondary position" and does
not attempt an explanation of the rationale by which he was "driven to conclude. . . that the
First Amendment must provide some measure of protection for public access to the trial." Id.
at 604 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Stewart, abandoning some of the
implications of his Gannett opinion, see note 73 infra and accompanying text, deemed it relevant in Richmond Newspapers that "it has for centuries been a basic presupposition. . . that
trials shall be public trials," id. at 599 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), and implied his agreement
with that aspect of the Chief Justice's opinion which inferred a right to access from the fact
that "a trial courtroom is a public place." Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). The Stewart opinion,
however, offers to reconcile his conclusion neither with those aspects of Gannett with which it
was inconsistent nor with his own prior statement that "[tihere is no constitutional right to
have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy." Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
27. Justice Rehnquist's dissent makes three basic points. First, it implies that the opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan are mutually inconsistent and reflective of
personal idiosyncrasies rather than legal principles. Second, it reasserts Justice Rehnquist's
view that neither the first, sixth, nor ninth amendment "requires that a State's reasons for
denying public access to a trial

. . .

are subject to any additional constitutional review." 448

U.S. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Third, it chides the Court for undermining "a healthy
pluralism" by assuming "all of the ultimate decisionmaking power over how justice shall be
administered. . . in each of the 50 States"--"a task that no Court consisting of nine persons,
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that one of its fundamental premises-that state autonomy is itself a
value which the Court ought to have weighed in the constitutional
balance28 -- evoked no response whatsoever from any of his brethren.
CIEF JUSTICE BURGER'S OPINION-A FIRST LOOK

Chief Justice Burger's opinion, which "attracted the most adherents, opens with a recitation of the history of the litigation. There
had been three previous trials of one Stevenson for the March 1976
murder of a hotel manager. A fourth trial, which ended in an acquittal after the introduction of the Commonwealth's evidence, was
closed to the public on the unopposed motion of the defendant, "presumably"29 on the authority of a Virginia statute granting the trial
judge discretion to "exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial."80 Appellants, resisting
the closure unsuccessfully in the trial court and in the Virginia Supreme Court, sought review in the United States Supreme Court of
their asserted right to attend the trial."
Chief Justice Burger began his analysis by stressing his view
that the case presented an issue of first impression. The Chief Justice
then turned his attention to elaborating an historical proposition that
became central to his analysis--"throughout its evolution, the trial
has been open to all who cared to observe."132 Tfie elaboration consisted both of marshalling, in somewhat summary fashion, the historical evidence of a tradition of openness, and of declaiming on "the
values of openness." 38 It described a "nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness,"" discerned "significant community therapeutic"8 5 and educational value in public trials, and
culminated in finding a "presumption of openness" inherent "in the
very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice. '" After
conceding that this presumption is not alone sufficient to meet the
dissenting).
however gifted, is equal to." Id. at 606 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
28. Id. at 606 (Rehnquist, J.,
29. Id. at 560.
30. VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (Supp. 1980). Chief Justice Burger's opinion does not purport
to hold the Virginia statute unconstitutional, the theory being that its validity "was not sufficiently drawn in question by appellants before the Virginia courts to invoke our appellate jurisdiction." 448 U.S. at 562 n.4.
31. 448 U.S. at 562-63.
32. Id. at 564.
33. Id. at 569.
34. Id. at 570.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 573.
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Commonwealth's argument that "neither the Constitution nor the
Bill of Rights contains any provision which by its terms guarantees
to the public the right to attend criminal trials,"3 7 Chief Justice Burger turned from historical exegesis to the more interesting and more
difficult question of whether such a right can be found "absent an
explicit provision." 's8
The Chief Justice answered this question through a two-step
analysis. The first step established a connection between the public
right to attend criminal trials and the explicit guarantees of the first
amendment. The second step conferred upon that connection constitutionally operative significance, if not legitimacy, by applying to it
the doctrine of "unarticulated," "implicit," "fundamental" rights.3 9
The opinion forges a dual connection between the explicit guarantees of the first amendment and the right to attend criminal trials.
First, it takes note of the "common core purpose" of the amendment's "expressly guaranteed freedoms'--namely, that "of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government.

4 1

It states that the manner in which criminal trials

2
are conducted is, of high "concern and importance to the people"'
and that "[t]he Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of
the long history of trials being presumptively open.' 3 Based on these
truisms the opinion infers that ''[i]n guaranteeing freedoms such as
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to
those explicit guarantees."" It concludes that "the First Amendment
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open
5
to the public at the time that Amendment was adopted.'4

Second, from the traditional openness of trials, and because the
Court has long protected the exercise of first amendment rights in
places "traditionally open,"' e the opinion infers an "affinity"' 7 be37.
38.

Id. at 575.

Id.

39. Id. at 579-80.
40. Id. at 575.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).

45.

Id. at 576.

46. Id. at 577.
47. Id.
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tween the right of access to criminal trials-"assured by the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and
press" 48 -and the right of'assembly. Citing a number of public-forum cases, 49 the opinion implies that public-forum doctrine represents an appropriate analogy: "[A] trial courtroom also is a public
place where the people generally-and representatives of the media-have a right to be. ...
Having thus established the connection between the right of access to criminal trials and the explicit guarantees of the first amendment, the opinion proceeds to the second and final step in its constitutional analysis by invoking the doctrine that "fundamental rights,
even though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the
Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."151 This step is taken in two sparse paragraphs which simply
affirm the notion that "certain unarticulated rights are implicit in
enumerated guarantees."5
The ninth amendment is described in a footnote as serving "to
foreclose application to the Bill of Rights [of] the maxim that the
affirmation of particular rights implies a negation of those not expressly defined." 53 The conclusion that the right to attend criminal
trials is such an implicit right is announced. The indispensability of
such a right to the enjoyment of those explicit in the first amendment is then assertively defended: "[W]ithout the freedom to attend
such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated.' "5
In the last paragraph of his opinion, Chief Justice Burger examined the trial closure order in the Richmond Newspapers case itself. By declining "to define the circumstances in which all or parts
of a criminal trial may be closed to the public," 5 5 and strongly implying that it was incumbent upon a trial judge to explore and attempt to implement alternatives to closure as means to insure the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 578. The cases cited are Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); DeJonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937).
50. 448 U.S. at 578.
51. Id. at 580.
52. Id. at 579.
53. Id. n.15.
54. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
55. Id. at 581 n.18.
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fairness of the trial,5" the Chief Justice fastened on the absence of
"findings to support closure" 57 as the key flaw in the order. "Absent
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal
case must be open to the public. Accordingly, the judgment under
review [was] reversed."'5 8
CHEF JUSTICE BURGER'S OPINIoN-A CLOSER LOOK
Chief Justice Burger's opinion invites analysis on several
grounds. In general, the opinion's most striking feature is its tone of
utter conviction, its apparent imperviousness to countervailing pressures, and its air of inexorability.5 9 In terms of the Chief Justice's
own judicial philosophy, it is remarkable that a jurist once characterized as a strict constructionist would without hesitation lend a
sympathetic ear either to sociological notions as vague as an asserted
need for "community catharsis,"6 0 or to constitutional arguments
grounded on the rather ephemeral shoals of the ninth amendment.61
On a more practical level, one might be bewildered about the scope
of the right of access that the opinion arguably affirmed.62 One
might also be perplexed about the nature of, the extent of, and the
means short of closure that must be used to protect any "overriding
interest" that a trial judge finds himself able to articulate in findings."3 For purposes of this article, however, three aspects of the
opinion have been selected for more extended analysis: its treatment
of precedent, its use of history, and its public-forum analysis.
56. Id. at 580-81.
57. Id. at 580.
58. Id. at 581.
59. This aspect of the opinion is particularly striking not only because the arguments
advanced by Chief Justice Burger in favor of the right are problematic, see notes 64-128 infra
and accompanying text, but also because it ignored the powerful arguments that have been
advanced in favor of a different conclusion. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 316 (1978)(opinion of Burger, C.J.); BeVier, supra note 23; O'Brien, supra note 23.
60. 448 U.S. at 571.
61. Cf.Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REv. 1, 38
(1968) ("even assuming the propriety of a judicial exposition of unenumerated rights, the need
for a resuscitation of the ninth amendment is not established"); Note, The UncertainRenaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 814, 815 (1966)(ninth amendment "only
a rule of construction").
62. Several commentators have remarked on the obscurity of the right affirmed in Richmond Newspapers. See, e.g., Reznek, supra note 7, at 125-28; Note, Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia: A Demarcationof Access, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv.937, 951 (1980); Note, supra
note 8, at 196; Comment, supra note 4, at 547.
63. Cf., e.g., The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 8, at 156 n.42 (showing required to close any part of trial "unclear").
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Treatment of Precedent
Chief Justice Burger's opinion fails to make a sustained or satisfying effort to fit his new doctrine-however awkward that task must
necessarily have proved-"into the body of [first amendment] precedent.1' 6" At one point in the opinion, the Chief Justice observed that
"the precise issue presented here has not previously been before this
' This observation seems designed to imply that
Court for decision." 65
the issue in Richmond Newspapers was somehow sui generis-so different in kind from prior cases that it left the Court unconstrained
by apparently inconsistent precedents.
It is, of course, literally true that the Court had never decided
the precise issue framed by Chief Justice Burger: "whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that
some other overriding consideration requires closure."68 But to say
that Richmond Newspapers was literally unprecedented is not to affirm that it arose in a precedential void. To the contrary, Richmond
Newspapers offered the Court an unexploited opportunity to confront and perhaps resolve a pervasive and mounting tension between
prior cases which broadly, though in dicta, affirm the importance of
the right of the public to be informed 67 and those that deny or undermine the right in particular contexts.6 8 More specifically, the case
invited careful comparison to a number of earlier holdings of closely
analogous issues.
Just the previous term, for example, the Court had decided, in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,9 that there was no sixth amendment
right to attend pretrial hearings. Chief Justice Burger could hardly
have ignored Gannett. He did indeed attempt to distinguish it, partly
on the ground presaged in his Gannett concurring opinion-that "a
64. Cox, supra note 7, at 26.
65. 448 U.S. at 563-64.
66. Id. at 564.
67. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
68.

See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); Zurcher v.

Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).

69. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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pretrial suppression hearing. . .'is not a trial' "7 ---and partly on the
ground that the Court there had not decided the first amendment
issue.71 Neither of these distinctions, however, sufficiently explains
the different results in the two cases. Gannett rejected a claim of
access to a pretrial proceeding rather than to a trial, and Justice
Stewart's opinion in Gannett occasionally adverted to this fact.72 The
burden of Justice Stewart's rationale did not, however, seem to rest
on this distinction. Rather, his analysis affirmed two principles that
apply equally to trials and to pretrial proceedings: first, that "the
public trial-guarantee [is] one created for the benefit of the defendant, '73 and second, that the "public interest in the enforcement of
Sixth Amendment guarantees

. . .

is fully protected by the partici-

pants in the litigation."7 4 In differentiating between pretrial proceedings and trials in his Gannett concurrence and in his Richmond
Newspapers opinion, Chief Justice Burger does not respond convincingly to these aspects of Justice Stewart's Gannett rationale.
In terms of the distinction inherent in the argument that Richmond Newspapers proceeded along first rather than sixth amendment lines, Chief Justice Burger's analysis suggests that it is the history of openness of trials that buttresses the first amendment claim.
It implies that the constitutional significance of this history is different for first amendment claims than for sixth amendment issues.7 5 In
ascribing doctrinal significance to history in Richmond Newspapers,
however, Chief Justice Burger's opinion does not explicate how he
determined that the common law rule of open proceedings was incorporated in-rather than "rejected or left undisturbed by" 7 ---the
first amendment. Nor does the opinion acknowledge the need that
Justice Stewart discerned in Gannett to "distinguish between what
the Constitution permits and what it requires. 7 7 Thus, Chief Justice
Burger's Richmond Newspapers opinion, though not ignoring Gannett, is not a fully satisfying treatment of Gannett's implications.
70. 448 U.S. at 564 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979)(Burger, C.J., concurring)).

71.

Id.

72.

See, e.g., 443 U.S. at 385 ("the issue here is whether the Constitution requiresthat

a pretrial proceeding.

. .

be opened to the public")(emphasis in original); id. at 387-88 (foot-

note omitted) ("pretrial proceedings . . . were never characterized by the same degree of

openness
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

as were actual trials").
Id. at 380.
Id. at 383-84.
448 U.S. at 575-80.
443 U.S. at 385.
Id.
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Gannett, however, was not the only relevant precedent. Pell v.
Procunier'7 6 Saxbe v. Washington Post,7 9 and Houchins v. KQED,
Inc.,8 --the prison access cases-fairly cry out for reconciliation. 81
In those cases, the Court rejected claims of access, for informationgathering purposes, that were clearly premised on the notion that the
first amendment protects, as a supplement or corollary to the right to
publish and speak freely about governmental affairs, the right to
gather information about them. 2 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Richmond Newspapers evinces considerable sympathy for such a
premise, 8 but the opinion does little to explain why it is an appropriate governing principle in this case when it was so unpersuasive in
the prison-access context.
There are at least two obvious technical distinctions between the
prison-access cases and Richmond Newspapers. First, in the prisonaccess cases it was possible to characterize the issue not as whether a
public right of access (to government or facilities) exists, but as
whether the press has a greater right than the general public. Indeed, the Court did so characterize the nature of the claims. The
cases, therefore, are thought to stand for the narrow proposition that
"[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access.

. .

beyond that

afforded the general public,"'" rather than for the broader proposition that the public itself enjoys no right of access. Since the appellants in Richmond Newspapers sought to vindicate the right of the
general public rather than a special newsgatherer's right, the rejection of the access claims in Procunier, Saxbe, and Houchins was
plainly not fatal. Nonetheless, the first amendment rationale for the
claim of access in those cases was so similar to that advanced---or at
least rhetorically invoked-by Chief Justice Burger in Richmond
Newspapers that some recognition of the cases' affinity would at
least have acknowledged the need for this particular distinction.
None, however, was offered.
The other obvious distinction between the prison-access cases
and Richmond Newspapers was drawn by Chief Justice Burger, but
78. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
79. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
80. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
81. As Professor Cox has perceptively noted, the Court in Richmond Newspapers might
reasonably have been expected also to have attended to the implications of Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)(per curiam). Cox, supra note 7, at 26.
82. See BeVier, supra note 23, at 489-91.
83. See, e.g., 448 U.S. at 575-76.
84. Procunier,417 U.S. at 834.
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only in a footnote: "Procunier and Saxbe are distinguishable in the
sense that they were concerned with penal institutions which, by definition, are not 'open' or public places. Penal institutions do not
share the long tradition of openness .

,,.
B In this as in other con-

texts, however, the tradition of openness provides an apt distinction
between trials and prisons only if it is truly relevant in terms of the
first amendment rationale for access." But, as will be more fully
explored below,87 the tradition of openness forges a tenuous link between the governmental activity to which access is sought and the
first amendment's "core purpose

. . .

of communication on matters

relating to the functioning of government."88
Conspicuously absent from Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Richmond Newspapers is any mention of his own opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Houchins, an opinion whose governing premises are particularly difficult to reconcile with the Richmond Newspapers result. For although Houchins was a case
involving press rather than public access, and although access was
sought to a jail rather than to a criminal trial, Chief Justice Burger's
inquiry in Houchins focused on the broad question of whether "the
First Amendment [or] the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right
of access to government information or sources of information within
the government's control." 8 9 The analysis in that case, which led him
to conclude that no such right of access existed, neither stressed that
jails were traditionally closed nor appeared to rely on the "special
press rights" 90 aspect of the case.
There is much in the Houchins opinion that is discordant with
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Richmond Newspapers. For example, it weighed heavily against the claimed right in Houchins that
85.
86.

448 U.S. at 576 n.11.
Professor Cox, for example, offers an account of the relevance of the history of open-

ness to the first amendment analysis in Richmond Newspapers which arguably represents "the
gist of the decision," Cox, supra note 7, at 23, but which is not explicitly articulated in the
Chief Justice's opinion:
As the law matures, the rudimentary distinctions between action and inaction, right
and privilege, or aggressive interference and withholding of benefit become too simple. Closing the door of a courtroom that has always been open can be realistically
viewed as interference with observation and public reporting rather than as preser-

vation of the confidentiality of one variety of official business.
Id. at 22.

87. See notes 107-112 infra and accompanying text.
88.

448 U.S. at _75.

89. 438 U.S. at 15.
90.

Id. at 12.
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the "Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a
right of access to all sources of information within government control."'" The absence of precedent for the claimed right of access in
Richmond Newspapers, however, was nearly inconsequential; indeed,
Chief Justice Burger took pains to assert that the question presented
was a first. It was deemed fatal in Houchins that "[t]here is no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to disclose, or for standards
governing disclosure of or access to information. 9 2 In Richmond
Newspapers, on the other hand, the Chief Justice was only momentarily inconvenienced by realizing that "the Constitution nowhere
spells out a guarantee for the right of the public to attend trials,"9 3
and he simply found that the case presented "no occasion"" to delineate the standards by which that right was to be measured. In
Houchins, the Chief Justice concluded that "[t]he public importance
of conditions in penal facilities and the media's role of providing information afford no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of
the public or the media to enter these institutions." 95 In contrast, the
public interest in trials carried considerable weight in Richmond
Newspapers, for it was quite relevant to the Chief Justice that
"[p] lainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government
of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in
which criminal trials are conducted." 96e Finally, in Houchins the
Chief Justice was unimpressed with the argument that Branzburg v.
Hayes17 lent support to the access claim. He said of Branzburgthat
"[i]ts observation, in dictum, that 'news gathering is not without its
First Amendment protections' . . . in no sense implied a constitu-

tional right of access to news sources."981 The view he took of
Branzburg in Richmond Newspapers, however, was considerably-though inexplicably-more sympathetic to its implications:
[W]e have recognized that "without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what
takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe
91. Id. at 9.
92. Id. at 14.
93.

448 U.S. at 579.

94. Id. at 581 n.18.
95. 438 U.S. at 9.
96. 448 U.S. at 575.
97.

408 U.S. 665 (1972).

98. 438 U.S. at 10 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707).
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the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily. 9
HistoricalDiscussion
Chief Justice Burger's opinion suggests that the constitutional
right of access to trials is somehow derived from the "presumption of
openness" that he infers from historical practice.10 0 Furthermore, the
language affirming the right's first amendment protection seems
pointedly to refer to historical openness as part of the right's definition and hence an indication of its limits: "[T]he First Amendment
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open
to the public at the time that Amendment was adopted."1 01
The success of the Chief Justice's effort to derive the right of
access from and concomitantly limit its applicability to situations in
which there exists a historic tradition of openness is questionable for
a number of reasons. First, the opinion itself merely invokes history:
It gives no reasons why historical practice qua historical practice is
the appropriate source of a constitutional right of access to criminal
trials. In other words, the opinion delineates no necessary relationship between a presumption of openness and a constitutional command of openness.'0 2 Furthermore, as has previously been noted, 03
the opinion fails to explain why, simply because the analysis in Richmond Newspapers follows the first rather than the sixth amendment
as did Gannett, the history demonstrates what it failed to demonstrate in Gannett-"more than the existence of a common-law rule
of open civil and criminal proceedings."'0'°
Second, the opinion's historical analysis tends to affirm not the
relevance of history but the virtues of openness-virtues that would
seem to inhere in openness even absent an "unbroken, uncontra99. 448 U.S. at 576-77 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681).
100. Id. at 573.
101. Id. at 576.
102. For example, although Chief Justice Burger noted that "[t]he Bill of Rights was
enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively open," 448 U.S.
at 575, he made no serious effort to establish the proposition that the framers intended to
create a public right of access to trials. For a discussion of some of the uses and abuses of
historical analysis, especially insofar as it invokes the "intention of the framers," see C.
MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
The discussion in text is meant to suggest not that historical practice is necessarily irrelevant in shaping constituional doctrine but that the import of particular traditions ought to be
specified with more care than is evident in Chief Justice Burger's opinion.
103. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
104. 443 U.S. at 384.
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dicted history."105 Furthermore, much of the opinion's first amendment discussion is as plainly pertinent to governmental activities that
do not have a history of openness as to those that do. For example,
the traditional openness of trials makes neither more nor less true
the Chief Justice's observation that "[t]he explicit, guaranteed rights
to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial would
lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was
here, be foreclosed arbitrarily."10
Indeed, the question raised by Chief Justice Burger's invocation
of history can be most sharply focused in first amendment terms:
What is the relevance of the historical fact of openness to the first
amendment rationale that supposedly sustains the right-of-access
claim? In his Richmond Newspapers opinion, Chief Justice Burger
seemed to ally himself with standard right-of-access analysis when
he referred to the first amendment's expressly guaranteed freedoms'
"common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government,"10 7 and when he
asserted that "[in guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech
and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right
of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit
guarantees.' 0 8 The standard analysis, however, implies that the critical first amendment variable of the right of access is the relevance
to public debate of the information to which access is sought. The
connecting link between a claim of access and the first amendment's
core purpose is not furnished by the coincidence of traditional openness. Rather, it is furnished by the connection between the facility or
information to which access is requested and the functioning of government. The characteristic of traditional openness is not even the
functional equivalent of relevance in terms of its responsiveness to
the first amendment's core purposes: Because prisons "do not share
the long tradition of openness"'' 0 9 of trials, surely discussion of, and
hence information about prisons do not fall outside the amendment's
110
core.
It must be remembered that the issue in Richmond Newspapers
105. 448 U.S. at 573.
106. Id. at 576-77.
107. Id. at 575.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 576 n.l1.
110. Cf. 448 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring)(finding it ironic that "the Court
should find more reason to recognize a right of access today than it did in Houchins").
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was not whether an acknowledged first amendment right to access
for purposes of gathering information about a particular governmental function had been unduly infringed by a particular trial closure.
Rather, the issue was whether a first amendment right of access for
purposes of gathering information should be recognized at all. Of
course, once it is conceded that a first amendment right of access to
government information exists, the history of openness of a particular government facility might well be considered pertinent in calculating the weight to be accorded the government's interest in denying
access in a particular case.'11 For example, to the extent that experience has demonstrated that openness is ordinarily compatible with
the proper and regular performance of the particular governmental
activity, it might be more difficult for the government to demonstrate
its substantial or compelling interests in denying access. Conversely,
a history of restrictions on access, of confidentiality, or of secrecy
might permit the more ready inference that access would materially
disrupt important functions and thus help the government to justify
a particular access restriction.
Chief Justice Burger, however, invoked the history of openness
not as a factor that might appropriately be considered in evaluating
a particular government effort to deny access, nor as a factor that
helped the Court to discern the appropriate level of protection for
first amendment rights of access. He invoked it rather as the factor
that permitted the Court to place the right within the amendment's
ambit. 112 For such a purpose, the history of openness is not to the
point, since it is unrelated to the value supposedly vindicated by the
right.
This is not to say that there is no discernible purpose to be
served by Chief Justice Burger's strategy of reasoning from the history of openness. On the contrary, the strategy provided the Chief
Justice both with a means of distinguishing the claim of access in
Richmond Newspapers from those that had been rejected in prior
cases, and with a rationale for refusing to extend first amendment
I 11. The assumption in text is that, once the "right of access [has been] found to exist,
impingements on that right [would] be evaluated under the familiar standards applicable to
governmental restrictions on speech." The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 8, at 158.
112. The distinction between the ambit of first amendment protection and the level of
protection recognizes that the question of what rights the first amendment includes is analyti-

cally separate from the issue of the appropriate scope of the amendment's shield. See Kalven,
The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV.

267, 278, 290; cf. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 8, at 157 (insisting that it is
vital for courts to distinguish between questions of existence and proper scope of a right).
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protection to any future access claim that is not propelled by the
seeming momentum of historical practice. For two reasons, however,
it seems unlikely that the Chief Justice will achieve a consensus on
the Court for the proposition that the tradition of openness represents an appropriate limiting principle for right-of-access claims.
First, several Justices have already gone on record to signal their
disagreement. The concurring opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice
Brennan in Richmond Newspapers itself, for example, clearly suggest those two Justices' unwillingness to be bound by such a limitation. Justice Stevens, even while joining the Chief Justice's opinion,
announced his continued adherence to the more inclusive rationale
that "the First Amendment protects the public and the press from
abridgement of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch." ' s And
Justice Brennan's "structural model," while giving "special force" to
a claim of access "drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of
public entree,"114 appeared to include within the first amendment's
ambit rights of access deemed important to particular governmental
processes without regard to tradition.
The second reason to doubt that a consensus can be built
around the tradition of openness as a limiting principle on the right
of access is simply that the Court has rarely perceived historical
practice as a significant constraint on its power to enlarge the scope
of constitutional rights.115 In the face of a powerful and seductive
first amendment rationale encompassing citizens' rights to be informed about all aspects of their government, the idea that the Constitution protects only the right to be informed about processes that
have been "traditionally open" seems unlikely to prevail.118
Public-ForumAnalysis
Chief Justice Burger posited, as part of the rationale for recognizing the right of access to criminal trials, an "affinity" between
113. 448 U.S. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
115. One example of the many instances of the Court's unwillingness to be bound by
historical conceptions is that first amendment doctrine represents an implicit repudiation of the
idea that the amendment's scope of protection is limited to the prevention of previous restraints upon speech or publication. Cf Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-15 (1931)(immunity from previous restraint "cannot be deemed to exhaust the conception of the liberty
guaranteed by state and federal constitutions").
116. Cf. Note, supra note 8, at 198 (unlikely that right will be limited since it is "simply
too powerful and far-reaching").
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such a right and the right of assembly.1 17 The analysis that attempted to delineate the relevance of right-of-assembly and publicforum doctrines to the issue in Richmond Newspapers, however, is
highly problematic. It assumed rather than answered the central
question posed by the case. 'It equated the traditional openness of
criminal trials with the existence of a "right to be present"118 there,
but it failed to fashion any convincing link between unbroken tradition and constitutional command.
A second flaw in the right-of-assembly analysis is more subtle.
It resides in the tendency of the analysis to blur the important distinction between the kind of first amendment activity-and hence
the nature of the first amendment right-that has traditionally been
protected and that was vindicated by the cited public-forum cases,
and the kind of first amendment activity involved in Richmond
Newspapers. In one sense, both the public-forum cases and Richmond Newspapers involved claims of access to government facilities
for the purpose of exercising first amendment rights. It is worth
noting, however, that the rights traditionally exercised in the public
fora to which Chief Justice Burger compared courtrooms-namely
"streets, sidewalks, and parks . . . places traditionally
open" 119-- were explicitly guaranteed by, and doctrinally well-entrenched in, the first amendment: the right to speak, to publish, to
assemble, and to petition for redress of grievances. The first amendment right the appellants in Richmond Newspapers sought to exercise, on the other hand, was neither explicitly guaranteed nor doctrinally secure: They sought access not to speak, publish, assemble, or
petition but rather to observe and to acquire information. Chief Justice Burger seemed to suggest that the public-forum analogy is apt,
despite the different purpose for which access was sought, simply because "[p]eople assemble in public places not only to speak or to
take action, but also to listen, observe, and learn."120 This analogy,
however, obscured rather than clarified the difficult first amendment
issue inherent in the claim of a right to access in order to "listen,
observe, and learn. 1 21
The Chief Justice's blurring of the important distinction be117.
118.

448 U.S. at 577-78.
Cf. Comment, supra note 4, at 554. ("Only by assuming that a courtroom was a

public place was Burger able to argue that people had a right to assemble there").
119.
120.
121.

448 U.S. at 578.
Id.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:311

tween traditional, textually protected first amendment rights and the
right to access claimed in Richmond Newspapers becomes apparent
when examining an aspect of public-forum doctrine the analysis fails
12 the Court sustained a statute speto address. In Cox v. Louisiana,
cifically prohibiting the exercise of traditional first amendment rights
near the courthouse. A fortiori, the Court would have sustained a
prohibition of such activity in the courtroom itself. Justice Goldberg's opinion in Cox noted that "the unhindered and untrammeled
functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our consti-

tutional democracy. 12 3 He concluded that, because it was "necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at
all stages is free from outside control and influence,"1 24 courts could
be protected by statute from becoming the location (as opposed, of
course, to the subject) of the exercise of rights of public discussion
and active political participation. Admittedly, there is ambiguity in
the Cox rule that "you cannot picket the courthouse. 1 25 This does
not, however, undermine the validity of the central insight: Although
trial courtrooms have been traditionally open, like streets and parks,
it simply cannot be said of courtrooms what was said of streets and
parks in Hague v. CIO.12 1 In that case, Justice Roberts stated that
streets and parks have "immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. 1 27 Thus, if Richmond Newspapers had been just
122. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
123. Id. at 562.
124. Id.
125. H. KALVEN,' The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, in THE NEGRO
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 173 (1966). Professor Kalven, with his inimitable cogency, posed
some of the relevant questions inherent in the Cox rdle:
Would this same protest ...
have been permissible if moved a few blocks away?
Could one, for example, distribute leaflets highly critical of the court near the
courthouse? Is there pressure and intimidation in the protest in front of the courthouse that ceases to be present when it is in front of the state house? Or is the
principle that it is all right to intimidate legislatures but not courts? Is the vice in
the picketing not so much in the time, place, and manner as in the message addressed to the court, and, if this is the vice, how can the result be squared with the
insistent line of precedents on contempt by publication? And, is it that in the courthouse situation the Court finally perceives the reality behind the gesture, so that
Cox is a harbinger of increasingly stringent restrictions on protests? Or is the point
the precise opposite, that only the special sensitivity of the law to the decorum of
court proceedings makes the conduct bad?
Id. at 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
126. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
127. Id. at 515 (emphasis added); cf. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)
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another public-forum case, its result would have been foreclosed by
Cox. Only by ignoring this crucial distinction could Chief Justice
Burger invoke the right of assembly in support of the Richmond
Newspapers outcome. 128
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S OPINmoN-A FIRST LOOK

Justice Brennan's concurring opinion offers an alternative rationale for the right of access that differs significantly from Chief Justice Burger's. The Brennan opinion begins by briefly discounting, in
two ways, whatever constraint the Court's prior-access cases might
otherwise have imposed upon its freedom of decision. First, Justice
Brennan insisted that "[t]hese cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public access to information may at times be implied by the First Amendment."129 Second, he implied that the cases
can be read to have actually recognized a right of access, their seemingly contrary holdings representing nothing more than sensitivity to
the "special nature"130 of the right.
.More significant and far more suggestive than Justice Brennan's
treatment of right-of-access precedents, however, is his adumbration
of the theoretical underpinnings of the right itself. Justice Brennan
posited what he described as a "structural role" for the first amendment in "securing and fostering our republicar system of self-government."131 The right of access is implicit in this structural role
since the structural role entails an "assumption that valuable public
debate-as well as other civic behavior-must be informed,"11 2 an
idea Justice Brennan credited Justice Powell's Saxbe dissent for having "foreshadowed." 138 In Justice Brennan's formulation, "[tlhe
("theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk
or public print").
128. One commentator, in the context of analyzing Justice Brennan's structural model
of the first amendment, has suggested that public-forum cases offered an appropriate analogy
to Richmond Newspapers on the theory that "the case implicated precisely the concerns that
gave rise to the original public forum doctrine. In both instances, the Court was asked to rule
that government could not completely foreclose the use of resources indispensable to informed
discussion about government." The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 8, at 155. For a
brief discussion of some of the implications of this view, see notes 157-158 infra and accompanying text.
129. 448 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
130. Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
131. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:3f1

structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails
solicitude not only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication." 134
Acknowledging the "theoretically endless"' 3 5 scope of the right,
Justice Brennan counselled "sensitivity to practical necessities,"1136
and sketched "two helpful principles" 1 37 to limit the scope of rightof-access claims in the future. One principle is that "the case for a
right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information."' 38 Since open trials are a matter of "virtually immemorial custom,"'1 39 a claimed right of access to trials has the requisite "special
force." The other "helpful principle" of limitation is that "the value
of access must be measured in specifics,"' 40 the question in each case
being "whether access to a particular government process is important in terms of that very process.' 4 Applying this second principle
to the question of access to trials, Justice Brennan reasoned that access is important to the trial process because it contributes to the
"demonstrative purpose"' 42 of trials; it restrains judicial abuse of political power by subjecting the "governmental proceeding" ' 43 of a
trial to the forum of public opinion, and it aids accurate factfinding.
Justice Brennan concluded that "our ingrained tradition of public
trials and the importance of public access to the broader purposes of
the trial process,
tip the balance strongly toward the rule that trials
44
be open.'
The Brennan opinion does not address the question of what
countervailing interests might be invoked to support closure of trials.
Justice Brennan deemed such inquiry inappropriate since "the statute at stake here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered discretion
of the judge and parties.' 45 Thus, Justice Brennan shared the Chief
Justice's unwillingness to speculate about the nature of potentially
at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)(footnote omitted).
at 588 (Brennar J., concurring in the judgment).
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). '
at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

134.
105.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

141.

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted).
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)(footnote omitted).
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successful arguments for future trial closures, but implicitly disagreed with the Chief Justice about the propriety of ruling on the
146
facial validity of the underlying state statute.
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S OPINION-A CLOSER LOOK

Justice Brennan's structural model plainly derives from,1 47 and
significantly extends,1 48 what may be described as a new orthodoxy
of the first amendment. In recent years, a consensus has emerged
about the implications of the basic insight, amounting almost to a
tautology, that the Constitution's promise of self-government is an
empty one unless citizens are free to speak and to publish facts,
views, and opinions about government. The emergent consensus is

that, because freedom of speech and of the press are essential to
democracy, the core value or purpose of the speech and press clauses
is to protect the processes of representative democracy established by
the Constitution.1 49 When government regulations of speech or publication are at issue, this perception of the first amendment's core
value can inform the Court's judgment about the nature and extent
of constitutionally permissible restrictions on rights of expression,
and can clarify the risks to relevant constitutional values that various
kinds of prohibition on expressive activity might entail. The connection between democracy and the freedoms of speech and press offers
a rationale for protecting speech and publication that is securely
anchored both in the constitutional text and in the "structure of government that it prescribes."150 Reasoning from this connection thus
renders first amendment rights of expression doctrinally secure and
legitimizes the exercise of judicial power to invalidate particular restraints on speech or publication."" 1
Justice Brennan's structural model of the first amendment is
also premised on the connection between the amendment and democracy. This connection, however, serves not the limited purpose of refining or legitimating doctrine regarding direct restraints on speech
146. Id. at 562 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
147. See notes 149-155 infra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 156-159 infra and accompanying text.
149.

Cf Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (noting "practically universal

agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs").
150.

Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4

(1971).
151.

See BeVier, The FirstAmendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry Into the Sub-

stance and Limits of Principle, 30

STAN.

L. REv. 299 (1978).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:311

or publication. Rather, it serves as the principal justification for extending the reach of the first amendment well beyond direct regulation of the printed or spoken word. From the widely accepted premise that freedom of speech and of the press are protected because
they preserve the structure of government prescribed by the Constitution, Justice Brennan apparently reasons that "preserving the
structure of constitutional government"152 is an appropriate function
of the Court in the first amendment area. 15 3 This at least seems to be
152. 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
153. In support of his structural role of the first amendment, id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment), Justice Brennan cites the following: United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-50
(1936); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUST 93-94 (1980); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970); A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Bork, supra
note 150, at 23; Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1979). These authorities are not plainly off the mark, in that both the cited portions of the cases and the work of
the various commentators affirm the existence of an integral relationship between democratic
government and free political discussion. It must be said, however, that the authorities hardly
provide unequivocal support for Justice Brennan's structural role in the context of the question
presented by Richmond Newspapers, since they do not address that precise question.
Stromberg, for example, held unconstitutional that part of a statute which could be read to
prohibit peaceful and orderly opposition to organized government. Its support for "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people," 283 U.S. at 369, was therefore invoked in the context of a
direct prohibition of expressive conduct rather than in connection with an indirect barrier to
information gathering. A similar point can be made about Grosjean'sreference to Judge Cooley's
propounded "test": "The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press
merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and
general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an
intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens." 297 U.S. at 249-50. This statement was offered
to support the Court's effort to compare a gross receipts tax on certain newspapers to traditional prior restraints rather than to defend a self-conscious expansion of the amendment's
reach to include protection from indirect abridgement.
Along these same lines, with reference to the cited scholarship, Professor Ely's thesis that
the "expression related provisions of the First Amendment. . .were centrally intended to help
make our governmental processes work, to ensure the open and informed discussion of political
issues," J. ELY, supra, at 93-94, was not offered as a focused response to the question whether
the first amendment imposes an obligation on the Court to protect more than the rights to
speak, publish, petition, and assemble. And, to. the extent the thesis does support such an
obligation, it is subject to the intractable difficulties that inhere because "it does nothing to tell
the judge where he should look for guidance in rendering decisions within his commission."
Cox, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 700, 714 (1981).
Professor Bork's remark that "the entire structure of the Constitution creates a representative democracy, a form of government that would be meaningless without freedom to discuss
government and its policies," Bork, supra, at 23, is pertinent to his analysis of the kind of
speech that the Constitution protects but does not necessarily inform analysis of the different
question of what the first amendment protects in addition to speech. And Professor
Meiklejohn's analysis, focused as it was entirely on issues of freedom, "did not specifically
consider whether the Constitution confers a right to know on individual citizens." BeVier,
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the meaning inherent in his assertions that the first amendment "has
a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government"'" and that it "entails solicitude not only
for communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of
meaningful communication. 15
Justice Brennan first outlined his structural model of the first
amendment in an address he delivered at the dedication of the S. I.
Newhouse Center for Law and Justice in Newark, New Jersey in
1979;151 but Richmond Newspapers provided him with his first opportunity to apply the model in the decision of an actual case. Because the scope of this article is limited to the Richmond Newspapers opinions and to their proferred rationales in the particular
context of that case, it would unmanageably extend the reach of this
discussion to attempt a full exploration of the theoretical foundations
or the doctrinal implications of Justice Brennan's structural model.
It is appropriate to note, however, that the model is explicitly
designed to overcome the limitations inherent in supposing that the
"First Amendment protects only self-expression, only the right to
speak out. 1 57 In addition, the model can justify its extension of the
first amendment only by putting the connection between the first
amendment and democracy to use in a legal context wholly different
from that in which the connection was first invoked as an appropriate premise for first amendment decisionmaking. 158
It may well be, as Professor Cox has suggested, that "[a]s the
law matures, the rudimentary distinctions between action and inaction, right and privilege, or aggressive interference and withholding
of benefit become too simple."' 59 Justice Brennan failed to explain,
however, how an insight answering one, relatively well-focused question which took these distinctions quite for granted-why does the
first amendment protect freedom of speech and of the press?-is
alone powerful enough to erase such historically significant legal nuances. If the question in Richmond Newspapers had been-why does
supra note 23, at 504. That Justice Brennan's citation to Professor Emerson's book is similarly

out of context is perhaps less troubling since Professor Emerson has in later work specifically
addressed the "right to know" issue and resolved it in a fashion similar to that adopted by
Justice Brennan. See Emerson, supra note 23.
154. 448 U.S. 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).

155.

Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

156. Brennan, supra note 153.
157. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
158. For a discussion of this practice as used by Justice Brennan, see note 153 supra.
159. Cox, supra note 7, at 22.
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the first amendment protect public access to trials?-then the Court
could have invoked the structure of constitutional democracy as a
rationalizing principle. But the question was not why, it was
whether. In affirmatively resolving this more basic question, Justice
Brennan's structural model invoked the framework of democracy to
a much more ambitious end than that for which it was conceived. He
put it to use not to rationalize doctrine but to create it, not to solidify textually secured rights against the government, but to expand
textually unspecified governmental duties.
Justice Brennan's structural model is a more expansive rendition
of the implications of the perceived connection between freedom of
speech and democracy than is the standard right-of-access rationale.
Pursuant to the standard rationale, the connection has expansive implications because it is invoked, as Justice Brennan invoked it, not
merely as a means to confer coherence and legitimacy on the effort
to make the first amendment an effective shield against government
regulation of speech or the press. It serves also as a sword by which
to impose on the government an affirmative duty to provide citizens
with information about or access to governmental processes. Pursuant to Justice Brennan's rationale, however, the connection opens
additional doctrinal vistas; it becomes, in effect, a mandate to the
Court to establish (albeit of necessity only in particular cases as they
arise) "the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication."160
If it is implicitly more expansive than the standard right-of-access rationale, Justice Brennan's structural model is explicitly less
inclusive, at least insofar as it is elaborated in Richmond Newspapers. The standard chain of reasoning, which links the right of access to the core value of representative self-government via the contribution that information about government necessarily makes to
intelligent communication among citizens, does not readily yield a
principle by which access to information relevant to self-government
might be denied. Indeed, the rationale plainly suggests that, at least
for purposes of evaluating the first amendment side of any access
question, all such information is included because all of it is relevant.
All of it should, therefore, be accessible to citizens. Justice Brennan's
structural model disparages the analytical power of such "rhetorical
statements that all information bears upon public issues." 61 In order
160.

448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

161.

Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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to determine whether a particular claim of access ought to come
within the ambit of the first amendment and thus to limit the "theoretically endless"1 62 reach of the right, he would replace "relevance
to self-government" as the critical first amendment variable with two
quite different inquiries. First, he would ask whether there exists "an
enduring and vital tradition of public entree," 1 3 and second,
"whether access to a particular government process is important in
terms of that very process."' " Justice Brennan's opinion, unfortunately, does not construct a very sturdy bridge between these inquiries and the ultimate issue of first amendment interpretation that they
supposedly address.
Justice Brennan's justification for looking to history as one potential limit on the right of access is worth examining. A tradition of
public entree, he said, "commands respect in part because the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More importantly, a tradition of
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience."1 6 5 But
the Constitution's "gloss of history" and the "favorable judgment of
experience" are not in themselves sufficient to establish the proposition that tradition is a viable limiting principle with reference to the
right of access. They must be shown to bear with unique and special
relevance on this particular first amendment question,166 a showing
not made in Justice Brennan's opinion.
But Justice Brennan does not rely solely on history to limit the
right of access. He offers a second limiting principle-the inquiry
into "whether access to a particular government process is important
in terms of that very process"1 67 -- which apparently elaborates upon
his structural model of the first amendment. The precise nature of
the inquiry's relationship to "that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive,"1 68 and the exact way in which an
answer to the inquiry might illuminate the content of "the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication"1 69 are not, however,
explained.
Although offered as part of his effort to restrain the "theoreti162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
See notes 101-112 supra and accompanying text.
448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J.,concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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cally endless" 170 stretch of the right to gather information, the inquiry into whether access to a particular governmental process is important in terms of the process fails to focus first amendment
analysis. To the contrary, the inquiry attenuates the connection between the right of access and the objective of informed public debate
upon which the right has usually been premised. For example, the
several virtues cited by Justice Brennan in his analysis of "the importance of public access to the trial process itself"1 11 suggest that
the full range of instrumental goals thought to be served by access
under his structural model are not fully captured merely by equating
information about the judicial process with meaningful communication about government.172 Implicit in Justice Brennan's notion that
access to trials aids the "demonstrative" purpose of trials, 7 3 restrains the abuse of political power by judges in the course of litigation, and advances accurate factfinding, is the conclusion that the
implications of his structural model are not confined to those foreshadowed in Justice Powell's assertion that "public debate must not
only be unfettered: it must also be informed."17 4 These goals, which
Justice Brennan found well served by access to trials, may be worthy
and might even be thought necessary to the ultimate preservation of
our democracy. They have, however, only a tenuous connection to
the idea that citizens require information if their speech is to be
truly free.
Moreover, at least as elaborated by Justice Brennan, the principle that would limit access to cases where it is deemed important in
terms of the process to which it is sought does not provide meaningful guidance concerning the most significant and controlling question
of how to discern whether access is important. Although the opinion
cautions that "the value of access must be measured in specifics, 1 7 5
much of Justice Brennan's analysis takes the form of generalities.
For example, the analysis of the virtues of access concerning the trial
process accords constitutional significance to the "pivotal role" of a
trial "in the entire judicial process, and, by extension, in our form of
170. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)(citation omitted).
171. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
172. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 8, at 154 (implications of Justice
Brennan's structural analysis "extend far beyond the creation of a novel constitutional right of
access to governmental proceedings").
173. 448 U.S. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
174. Saxbe v.,Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting).
175. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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government." 17 6 The trial is a "genuine governmental proceeding,"177 from which fact it seems, without more, to follow that "the
conduct of the trial is pre-eminently a matter of public interest," 18
and that "public access to trials acts as an important check, akin in
purpose to the other checks and balances that infuse our system of
government. 17'9 But surely it can be said about nearly every governmental process that it plays a "pivotal role.., inour form of government."18s0 And is not any process a "genuine governmental pro18 2
ceeding"' 181 and thus "pre-eminently a matter of public interest"?
Precisely because generalizations such as these can be so universally
invoked, they provide no discernible criteria by which to decide when
access to a particular process is important and when it is not. Thus,
Justice Brennan's second "helpful principle"1 83 for limiting the "theoretically endless"' 4 stretch of the right of access proves on examination to be neither particularly helpful nor in reality a principle.
CONCLUSION

This article makes two explicit points. First, it demonstrates
that Chief Justice Burger's conclusions in Richmond Newspapers depended on a rationale that failed adequately to account for even the
most obviously relevant precedents. The opinion conveyed the impression, but did not defend the proposition, that the result was ordained by historical practice, and blurred the distinction between the
right of access and textually guaranteed first amendment rights. Second, this article documents certain possibly untoward aspects of Justice Brennan's alternative rationale, especially its somewhat attenuated first amendment focus and its failure to specify meaningful
criteria for the resolution of future access claims. The implicit message of the article's analysis is readily stated: A result supported by
constitutional rationales that are either patently infirm or demonstrably unmanageable perhaps may not have earned the praise it has
received. Since Richmond Newspapers gave rise to such doctrinal
confusion, it is difficult to be sanguine about the Court's ability to
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

181. Id. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
182.

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

183.

Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

184.

Id. at 588 (Brennan, J.,concurring in the judgment)(citation omitted).
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take the measure of the more controversial access issues that seem
bound to arise in the future.
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